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In October 2019, the D.C. Circuit handed down its 
much-anticipated decision in Mozilla v. FCC, relying 
heavily on Chevron Deference and the Supreme Court’s 
2005 Brand X decision. The per curiam opinion upheld large 
portions of the FCC’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order, but also undermined the FCC’s preemption of state 
law while also remanding issues related to public 
safety, pole attachments, and the Lifeline Program to the 
agency, assuring that the legal and policy battles over net 
neutrality will continue. This Article traces the history of the 
FCC’s efforts on net neutrality as it has moved in and out of 
court since the FCC’s 2005 Policy Statement before 
exploring the decision in Mozilla. The Article then argues 
that the continuing uncertainty over net neutrality regulation 
should be resolved by Congress. 
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In December 2017, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to repeal 
its net neutrality rules.1 The order repealed the Title II rules passed 
in 2015 that had prohibited ISPs from blocking and throttling lawful 
internet content and prohibited paid prioritization for internet 
content delivery.2 This change would allow ISPs to favor some 
internet traffic over others.3 The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom 
order prompted immediate criticism from observers as well as 
lawsuits from several companies, states and organizations before the 
                                                 
1 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 529–32, 533–41, 
834-42, 843-45, 846-48 (2018) [hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom].  Those 
who voted yes included: Commissioners O’Rielly and Carr, as well as Chairman 
Pai. Those who voted no included: Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel. Id. 
The commissioners of the FCC were vocal about their opposition to or approval 
of the repeal. In dissenting vigorously, Commissioner Clyburn’s stated that 
greater issues – not just procedural sufficiency – loomed, “There has been a darker 
side to all of this over the past few weeks. Threats and intimidation. . . Particularly 
damning is what today’s repeal will mean for marginalized groups, like 
communities of color. . . . I close my eulogy of our 2015 net neutrality rules[.]” 
Commissioner O’Rielly’s statement focused on explaining away accused 
procedural malfeasance, “Some would have us believe that the comment process 
has been irreparably tainted by the large number of fake comments,” and itself 
was critical of the dissenting commissioners’ knowledge of agency procedural 
requirements, “That view reflects a lack of understanding about the 
Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 533-41, 834-42.   
2 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2015); see also Restoring Internet Freedom at 312–13. 
3 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2018); see also In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting 
the Open Internet (Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet), 30 FCC Rcd. 
5601, 5607– 08 (2015). 
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D.C. Circuit.4 After the FCC published the Restoring Internet 
Freedom order, Mozilla became the lead plaintiff as the first to 
formally re-file its complaint asserting that the FCC “depart[ed] 
from its prior reasoning and precedent” and, therefore, “violate[d] 
federal law,” including the Communications Act of 1934, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and FCC regulations 
promulgated thereunder.5 
After oral arguments, but before a decision was released, in an 
August 20, 2019 declaration submitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, Santa Clara County Fire Chief Anthony 
Bowden alleged that Verizon Wireless had throttled the internet 
services of the Santa Clara County Central Fire Protection District 
(County Fire).6 According to the declaration, which was filed as an 
addendum to a brief filed by 22 state attorneys general to the D.C. 
Circuit, County Fire “relies on Internet-based systems to provide 
crucial and time-sensitive public safety services.”7 However, 
Bowden asserted that the department “experienced throttling by its 
ISP, Verizon,”8 namely that its “data rates had been reduced to 
1/200, or less, than the previous speeds.”9 Bowden contended that 
the reduced speeds “severely interfered with [County Fire’s] ability 
to function effectively,”10 including during wildfires that “resulted 
                                                 
4 Christopher Terry, Scott Memmel, & Ashley Turacek, Lost in a Novelty 
Mug: U.S. Telecom, the FCC, and Policy Resolution for Net Neutrality, 41 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 26 (2019). 
5 Protective Petition for Review at 2, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051), (available at 
https://blog.mozilla.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/AS-FILED-Mozilla-
Protective-Petition-16Jan2018-1.pdf). 
6 Brief for Government Petitioners at 23-24, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051), 2018 WL 6242983 at 23-
24; see also Jon Brodkin, Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data 
During Calif. Wildfire, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/verizon-throttled-fire-departments-
unlimited-data-during-calif-wildfire/. 
7 See Brief for Government Petitioners at 10, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051). 
8 Addendum to Brief for Government Petitioners at 5 Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. 
Commc’n Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051). 
9 Id. at 6. 
10 Id. at 5. 
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in over 726,000 acres burned and roughly 2,000 structures 
destroyed.”11  
The next day, Verizon sent a statement to Ars Technica 
acknowledging that it should not have throttled County Fire’s data 
service, especially after the department had requested that Verizon 
lift the restrictions.12 Verizon explained their side of what went 
wrong:  
Regardless of the plan emergency responders 
choose, we have a practice to remove data speed 
restrictions when contacted in emergency situations 
. . . . We have done that many times, including for 
emergency personnel responding to these tragic fires. 
In this situation, we should have lifted the speed 
restriction when our customer reached out to us. This 
was a customer support mistake. We are reviewing 
the situation and will fix any issues going forward.13 
Verizon argued that the throttling was due to a customer service 
error and had “nothing to do with net neutrality.”14 However, in an 
August 22 statement, the Santa Clara County Counsel’s Office 
contended that the throttling had “everything to do with net 
neutrality—it shows that the ISPs will act in their economic 
interests, even at the expense of public safety,” adding, “[t]hat is 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Jon Brodkin, Fire Dept. Rejects Verizon’s “Customer Support Mistake” 
Excuse for Throttling, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/fire-dept-rejects-verizons-customer-
support-mistake-excuse-for-throttling/. Brodkin explained that previously, on 
June 29, 2019, Fire Captain Justin Stockman had written an email to Verizon, 
noting that “download speeds for an essential device used during large disasters 
had been throttled from 50Mbps to about 30kbps,” leading to a series of emails 
between Verizon and the department.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.; see also Net Neutrality, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality (last visited July 15, 2019). EFF defines 
net neutrality as “the idea that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all 
data that travels over their networks fairly, without improper discrimination in 
favor of particular apps, sites or services.” Id. 
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exactly what the Trump Administration’s repeal of net neutrality 
allows and encourages.”15 
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit released a per curiam 
opinion which upheld the FCC’s repeal of the net neutrality rules.16 
The court held that the FCC had the authority to repeal the agency’s 
2015 Title II provisions and had been reasonable in its approach to 
doing so.17 However, the court also remanded several issues back to 
the FCC, including requirements that the agency assess the 
rollback’s effect on public safety.18 The court also prohibited the 
FCC from barring states from drafting their own net neutrality 
regulations.19     
This Article argues that the D.C. Circuit ruling in Mozilla—
which concluded that the FCC was due wide deference to repeal the 
rules despite remanding several issues back to the agency—will 
greatly extend the long running policy and legal debate over net 
neutrality. Absent an act of Congress to provide the FCC with 
guidance, the legal battles will continue both at the state and federal 
levels. Because the FCC’s back and forth approach to structural 
internet regulation is likely to lead to more uncertainty, this Article 
argues that resolution of the issue is desirable. Furthermore, this 
Article contends that, ideally, net neutrality provisions should be 
restored because such rules can, and do, promote free expression on 
the internet. 
To explore this argument, this Article first walks through the 
history of the net neutrality debate from the FCC’s initial proposal 
                                                 
15 Jon Brodkin, supra note 12. 
16 Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per 
curiam). 
17 Id. at 57–59 (stating that, “We are, however, satisfied by the Commission’s 
other reasons for believing competition exists in the broadband market. . . the 
Commission barely survives arbitrary and capricious review on this issue.”); see 
also Marguerite Reardon, Net Neutrality Court Ruling: States Can Set Own Rules, 
CNET (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/net-neutrality-court-ruling-
states-can-set-own-rules/; see also Adi Robertson, The FCC Can Repeal Net 
Neutrality, but it Can’t Block State Laws, Says Court, VERGE (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/1/20893342/fcc-net-neutrality-repeal-dc-
appeals-court-ruling-state-law-preemption. 
18 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 59. 
19 Margaret Harding McGill, Court Mostly OKs FCC’s Net Neutrality Repeal 
but Lets States Craft Their Own Rules, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/01/fcc-net-neutrality-014801. 
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in 2005 through the agency’s 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom 
order. Second, this Article discusses the D.C. Circuit’s decision, 
focusing especially on the court’s application of Chevron deference 
as well as the three issues remanded to the FCC. Finally, this Article 
argues that Congress, or at the very least the states, need to act on 
this issue as net neutrality rules are an important mechanism that 
maximize opportunities for political participation by protecting free 
expression from private monopolization on the internet. 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
The following Part first provides background on the evolution 
of the net neutrality debate and key considerations regarding FCC 
decision-making between 2005 and the FCC’s adoption of the 2017 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Second, it provides important 
background information on the Chevron Doctrine and deference. 
 
A.  Net Neutrality 
 
Net neutrality, a term coined by Tim Wu,20 is a regulatory 
concept that can be traced back to the FCC’s 2005 policy statement 
contending that anyone who can access the internet should be able 
to access any content on any device.21 In support of this contention, 
the FCC cited § 230(b) of the amended Communications Act of 
1934 which included Congress’ policy to “preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet” and 
“to promote the continued development of the Internet.”22 
Under the guidance of these Congressional directives and “to 
ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, 
affordable, and accessible to all consumers,”23 the FCC adopted four 
principles: 
                                                 
20  Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 144 (2003) (discussing the “normative 
principle of network neutrality”). 
21 In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986–88 (2005) [hereinafter 
Framework]; see also Terry, Memmel, & Turacek, supra note 4. 
22 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012). 
23 Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14987; supra note 4, at 4. 
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 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
access the lawful Internet content of their choice. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run 
applications and use services of their choice, 
subject to the needs of law enforcement. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
connect their choice of legal devices that do not 
harm the network. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
competition among network providers, application 
and service providers, and content providers.24 
 
Five years later, a challenge was brought against the FCC’s 
authority to enforce the four principles after several of Comcast’s 
high-speed internet service subscribers discovered that the company 
had interfered with peer-to-peer networking applications.25 In 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the court focused on whether the FCC had 
authority to regulate an ISP’s network management practices.26 The 
FCC argued they had the authority to classify ISPs as “information 
services” under Title I of the Communications Act of 1934.27 
                                                 
24 Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14988, supra note 21 (emphasis omitted). 
25 See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html; see also Terry, 
Memmel, & Turack, supra note 4. 
26 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
27 Id. at 649–50. 
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The case arose after several of Comcast’s high-speed internet 
service subscribers alleged that the company was interfering with 
their use of peer-to-peer networking applications, which generally 
allow users to send files with each other without going through a 
central server.28 Such programs present competition for cable 
providers because they allow users to view high-quality videos that 
they would otherwise have to pay for on cable television through 
networking protocols like BitTorrent.29 In 2007, the Associated 
Press concluded that Comcast “actively interferes with attempts by 
some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to share files online.”30 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation reached a similar conclusion, 
finding that Comcast was selectively targeting customers who 
uploaded files using BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer protocols.31 
Comcast later admitted to interfering with peer-to-peer traffic, 
contending that it interfered “only during periods of peak network 
congestion” and only “during periods of heavy network traffic.”32 
In November 2007, Free Press, an advocacy group focused on 
media reform, filed a complaint with the FCC requesting that the 
agency declare “that an Internet service provider violates the 
                                                 
28 See Svensson, supra note 25. 
29 See id.; see also Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14988. 
30 Svensson, supra note 25. The AP continued: “Comcast’s interference 
affects all types of content, meaning that, for instance, an independent movie 
producer who wanted to distribute his work using BitTorrent and his Comcast 
connection could find that difficult or impossible.” Id. The AP further discovered 
that Comcast’s conduct had a “drastic effect . . . on one type of traffic _ [sic] in 
some cases blocking it rather than slowing it down,” concluding that the method 
used by Comcast was “difficult to circumvent and involves [Comcast] falsifying 
network traffic.” Id. 
31 Peter Eckersley, Fred von Lohmann, & Seth Schoen, Packet Forgery By 
ISPs: A Report On the Comcast Affair, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.eff.org/wp/packet-forgery-isps-report-comcast-affair. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation reached a similar conclusion, finding that Comcast 
was selectively targeting customers who uploaded files using BitTorrent and other 
peer-to-peer protocols. 
32 In the Matter of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge 
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications 
(Comcast Complaint), 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13032 (2007) (citing Letter from 
Mary McManus, Senior Director of FCC and Regulatory Policy, Comcast 
Corporation, to Kris A. Monteith, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, File No. EB-08-
IH-1518, at 5 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Response Letter]). 
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[Commission’s] Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally 
degrades a targeted Internet application.”33 Free Press also filed a 
petition for declaratory ruling requesting the FTC to “clarify that an 
Internet service provider violates the FCC’s Internet Policy 
Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted Internet 
application.”34  
In a petition for rulemaking, Vuze, Inc. asked the FCC “to adopt 
reasonable rules that would prevent the network operators from 
engaging in practices that discriminate against particular Internet 
applications, content or technologies.”35 The FCC summarily issued 
an order which stated that the agency had jurisdiction over 
Comcast’s network management practices, and that it could resolve 
the dispute through adjudication rather than through rulemaking.36 
Comcast complied with the order, but raised three objections. 
First, Comcast argued that the FCC did not have jurisdiction over its 
network management practices.37 Second, it argued that the FCC’s 
adjudicatory action was procedurally flawed because it 
circumvented the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and violated the notice requirements of the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.38 Finally, Comcast asserted 
that parts of the order were poorly reasoned, and were, as a result, 
arbitrary and capricious.39 
The D.C. Circuit discussed § 4(i) of the Communications Act of 
1934, which authorizes the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent 
with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”40 In Comcast, the FCC did not claim that Congress had 
given it express authority to regulate Comcast’s internet services.41 
In fact, in its 2002 Cable Modem order, the Commission ruled that 
cable internet service is neither a “telecommunications service” 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 13033. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2018). 
41 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 645. 
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covered by Title II of the Communications Act nor a “cable service” 
covered by Title VI.42 The Commission based its authority over 
Comcast’s network management practices on the broad language of 
§ 154(i) of the Act, which provides that the FCC can make rules and 
issue orders “as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”43 
Courts refer to the Commission’s § 154(i) power as its 
“ancillary” authority, a label derived from three Supreme Court 
decisions.44 In American Library Ass’n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit 
distilled the holdings of these three cases into a two-part test,45 
holding that the FCC “may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when 
two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general 
jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] 
covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably 
ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its 
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”46 Comcast conceded that the 
FCC’s action satisfied the first requirement because the company’s 
internet service qualified as “interstate and foreign communication 
by wire” within the meaning of Title I.47 The court was then tasked 
with deciding whether the FCC’s action satisfied the second prong 
of the American Library test. 
The FCC argued that the order satisfied American Library’s 
second requirement because it was “reasonably ancillary to the 
Commission’s effective performance” of its responsibilities under 
                                                 
42 67 Fed. Reg. 18,907 (Apr. 17, 2002); see generally In the Matter of Inquiry 
Concerning High–Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002), aff’d, National Cable and Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (giving further background on the 
reasoning behind this decision). 
43 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2018); Comcast Complaint, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13035–36. 
44 See, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972); FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979). All three of these 
cases dealt with Commission jurisdiction over early cable systems when, similar 
to 2009, the Communications Act gave the Commission no express authority to 
regulate such systems. 
45 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646. 
46 American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
47 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646; see also 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2018). 
10
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the Communications Act.48 However, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
FCC failed to adequately justify exercise of ancillary authority to 
regulate ISP’s network management practices, and that the FCC 
could not use its ancillary authority to pursue a stand-alone policy 
objective, rather than to support its exercise of a specifically 
delegated power.49 Furthermore, the court disagreed with the FCC 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, “already decided the 
jurisdictional question here.”50 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Comcast, the FCC 
released a 2010 order establishing disclosure and transparency 
requirements on ISPs.51 In the order, the FCC adopted three basic 
rules “[t]o provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the 
continued freedom and openness of the Internet.”52 The first rule 
was “transparency,” which required: 
A person engaged in the provision of broadband 
Internet access service shall publicly disclose 
accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance, and 
commercial terms of its broadband Internet access 
services sufficient for consumers to make informed 
choices regarding use of such services and for 
content, application, service, and device providers to 
develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.53 
The second rule prohibited ISPs from “blocking” content or 
access.54 The rule stated, “[a] person engaged in the provision of 
fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so 
                                                 
48 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646-47. 
49 Id. at 659. 
50 Id. at 649. 
51 Matthew Lasar, It’s here: FCC adopts net neutrality (lite), ARS TECHNICA 
(Dec. 21, 2010), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/its-here-fcc-adopts-
net-neutrality-lite/. 
52 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 
(2010) [hereinafter Preserving the Open Internet]. 
53 47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2011); see generally Preserving the Open Internet at 
17937 (explaining the reasoning behind the rule). 
54 Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC Rcd. at 17906. 
11
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engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or 
nonharmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.”55 
The final rule prohibited “unreasonable discrimination” in 
“transmitting lawful network traffic,”56 meaning that “[a] person 
engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably 
discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a 
consumer’s broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network 
management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.”57 
The order was summarily challenged by Verizon,58 marking the 
second time in less than five years in which the D.C. Circuit was 
confronted with an FCC effort to compel broadband providers to 
treat all internet traffic the same regardless of source. The FCC 
claimed that § 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 vested it 
with affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure.59 Verizon first claimed that 
neither subsection (a) nor (b) of § 706 provided the FCC with any 
regulatory authority.60 Second, Verizon argued that even if § 706 
granted the FCC with the necessary authority, the “scope of that 
grant” would not permit “the Commission to regulate broadband 
providers in the manner that the Open Internet rules did.”61 The 
court had stated that Chevron deference was “warranted even if the 
agency had interpreted a statutory provision that could be said to 
delineate the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.”62 
Verizon’s first claim was rejected. The D.C. Circuit ruled that 
the FCC had “reasonably interpreted § 706 to empower” it to 
promulgate rules governing broadband providers’ treatment of 
                                                 
55 47 C.F.R. §8.5 (2011); see generally Preserving the Open Internet at  25 
FCC Rcd. at 17942 (explaining the reasoning behind the rule). 
56 Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC Rcd. at 17992. 
57 27 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2011); see also Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC 
Rcd. at 17992. 
58 Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
59 Id. at 634; Terry, Memmel & Turacek, supra note 4. 
60 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
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internet traffic.63 The court also concluded that the FCC’s 
understanding of § 706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority 
represented a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.64 
Additionally, the court held that the Commission had authority 
under the Telecommunications Act to take steps to accelerate 
broadband deployment if and when it determined that existing 
efforts were not “reasonable and timely.”65 Furthermore, the court 
held that the FCC could compel fixed broadband providers under 
the Telecommunications Act to adhere to open network 
management practices that would meaningfully promote broadband 
deployment.66 
However, regarding Verizon’s second claim, the court found 
that the FCC had chosen to classify broadband providers in a way 
that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, and the 
Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from 
regulating them as such.67 Therefore, the court held that the FCC 
had failed to establish that anti-blocking rules did not impose per se 
common carrier obligations, vacating those portions of the 2010 
order.68 The court went on to conclude that the anti-discrimination 
and anti-blocking obligation imposed on fixed broadband providers 
“relegated [those providers], pro tanto, to common carrier status,”69 
also in violation of the Communications Act. The court therefore 
vacated and remanded the anti-discrimination and the anti-blocking 
rules.70 
                                                 
63 Id. at 628. 
64 Id. at 637. The court further wrote that the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 granted regulatory authority to the FCC and empowered it to promulgate 
rules governing broadband providers’ treatment of Internet traffic, including 
preserving and facilitating “virtuous circle” of innovation that had driven 
explosive growth of Internet. However, the FCC was limited by its subject matter 
jurisdiction and the requirement that any regulation be tailored to specific 
statutory goal of accelerating broadband deployment. Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 643. 
67 Id. at 652. 
68 Id. at 628. 
69 Id. at 655 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
70 Id. at 659. 
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In this case, the court held that the FCC could, and perhaps 
should, classify ISPs as Title II “common carriers” instead of under 
Title I of the Communications Act of 1934.71 According to the court, 
if the FCC did so, the agency would then have authority to regulate 
ISPs by releasing orders like the one at issue in the case.72 The 
majority held that the FCC’s decision not to reclassify providers 
under Title II as part of the 2010 order was a choice and that the 
FCC should reconsider.73 
In 2015, the FCC did just that in the Open Internet order, which 
classified ISPs as common carriers under Title II and § 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.74  
The Order enforced net neutrality through a variety of 
provisions, including three bright-line rules prohibiting ISPs from 
blocking and throttling lawful internet content, as well as prohibiting 
paid prioritization for internet content delivery, which would allow 
ISPs to favor some internet traffic over others.75 Paid prioritization 
refers to:  
 
[T]he management of a broadband provider’s 
network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic 
over other traffic, including through use of 
techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, 
resource reservation, or other forms of preferential 
traffic management, either (a) in exchange for 
consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third 
party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.76 
                                                 
71 Id. at 655. 
72 Id. at 632 (quoting American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
73 Id. at 649. 
74 47 C.F.R. § 8.2 (2015); see also Protecting and Promoting the Open 
Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5614 (“Taking the Verizon decision’s implicit invitation, 
we revisit the Commission’s classification of the retail broadband Internet access 
service as an information service and clarify that this service encompasses the so-
called ‘edge service.’”); see generally id. at 5721–24 (explaining the FCC’s use 
of § 706 as a basis for authority over the open internet and designating ISPs as 
common carriers). 
75 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5647. 
76 47 C.F.R. § 8.9(b) (2015); see generally Protecting and Promoting the 
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In U.S. Telecom v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 2015 Title 
II order, finding that the FCC had the authority to impose such an 
order, citing the suggestion made to the FCC by the majority in 
Verizon.77 The case arose following the 2015 Title II Order when 
several ISPs and industry associations petitioned for review in the 
D.C. Circuit. 
Conversely, U.S. Telecom argued that the Commission violated 
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) “include . . . either the terms 
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 
issues involved.”78 In particular, U.S. Telecom argued that the FCC 
violated this requirement because the proposed NPRM relied on § 
706, not Title II.79  
The D.C. Circuit rejected U.S. Telecom’s argument, finding that 
the NPRM had satisfied the test for validity of its final decision of 
reclassifying broadband service.80 The court also held that an NPRM 
provided adequate notice when it “expressly ask[ed] for comments 
on a particular issue or otherwise ma[de] clear that the agency [was] 
contemplating a particular change.”81  
The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC had adequately addressed 
commenters’ concerns about the agency’s decision to forbear from 
applying mandatory network connection and facilities unbundling 
requirements as part of actions to promote open internet, or “net 
neutrality.”82 The court found that the FCC had authority to regulate 
network connections, broadband service fell within FCC’s 
jurisdiction as interstate service, and that the Commission had no 
obligation to determine legal status of each underlying hypothetical 
                                                 
Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5653–59. 
77 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (Telecom I), 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 
2016). 
78 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1966). 
79 Telecom I, 825 F.3d at 700. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (alterations ours) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc.  Surface Transp. Bd., 584 
F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
82 Id. at 730. 
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regulatory obligation prior to undertaking forbearance analysis.83 
The court also held that the FCC was justified in reclassifying 
broadband internet service as telecommunications service subject to 
common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications 
Act.84 The court further found that “[c]ommon carriers have long 
been subject to nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin 
to those imposed by the rules without raising any First Amendment 
question.”85 
The D.C. Circuit ultimately denied an en banc hearing, to which 
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion.86 
Kavanaugh argued that the FCC did not have the authority to 
reclassify ISPs under the Communications Act of 1934.87 
Kavanaugh further contended that the 2015 Title II order had 
violated ISPs’ First Amendment rights by infringing on their 
editorial control and creating compelled speech.88 He cited two 
Supreme Court cases89 as evidence that “the First Amendment bars 
the Government from restricting the editorial discretion of Internet 
service providers, absent a showing that an Internet service provider 
possesses market power in a relevant geographic market.”90 
However, despite the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the FCC voted 3-2 
along party lines in December of 2017 to repeal its net neutrality 
rules.91 The order first “[r]estor[ed] the classification of broadband 
Internet access service as an ‘information service’” as it had been 
classified prior to the 2015 Title II Order.92 The FCC argued that 
this action would allow for “light-touch” regulation meant to 
promote “investment and innovation by removing regulatory 
                                                 
83 Id. at 730-31 (quoting AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836-37 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006)). 
84 Id. at 698; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623; Terry, Memmel & Turacek, 
supra note 4. 
85 Telecom I, 825 F.3d at 740. 
86 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (Telecom II), 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
87 Id. at 417. 
88 Id. at 418. 
89 Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)). 
90  Telecom II, 855 F.3d at 418. 
91 Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852. 
92 Id. 
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uncertainty and lowering compliance costs.”93 Second, the order 
“[adopted] transparency requirements that ISPs disclose 
information about their practices to consumers, entrepreneurs, and 
the Commission.”94 The new rule required ISPs to disclose several 
network practices, including instances of “blocking,” which the 
FCC defined as “[a]ny practice (other than reasonable network 
management elsewhere disclosed) that blocks or otherwise prevents 
end user access to lawful content, applications, service, or non-
harmful devices, including a description of what is blocked.”95 ISPs, 
also needed to disclose instances of “throttling,” which refers to 
“[a]ny practice (other than reasonable network management 
elsewhere disclosed) that degrades or impairs access to lawful 
Internet traffic on the basis of content, application, service, user, or 
use of a non-harmful device, including a description of what is 
throttled.”96 Finally, ISPs were required to disclose instances of 
“paid prioritization” and “affiliated prioritization,” meaning “[a]ny 
practice that directly or indirectly favors some traffic over other 
traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, 
prioritization, or resource reservation, to benefit an affiliate, 
including identification of the affiliate.”97 Additionally, the FCC 
eliminated its conduct rules for ISPs, including the bright-line rules 
preventing blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.98 
Meanwhile, the FCC delayed the petition for review of Telecom 
II seven times before the Court ultimately denied certiorari in the 
case.99 Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh recused 
themselves—Kavanaugh because he had already heard the case in 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 7891. 
95 Id. at 7983. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 7896. 
99 Telecom II, 855 F.3d 674, appeal denied, No. 17-504 (2017); see also 
Letter from Noel J. Francisco, U.S. Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. 
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the D.C. Circuit.100 The FCC’s 2017 repeal of net neutrality, as well 
as its delay in taking action on the petition for certiorari helped 
extend the messy legal landscape around net neutrality, requiring 
resolution that the D.C. Circuit has yet to provide and that the 
Supreme Court may decline to consider.101 
 
B.  Agency Decision-Making: Chevron Doctrine and Deference 
 
A rationally based decision in a rulemaking inquiry is likely to 
withstand judicial review when it has a number of relevant 
characteristics. First, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that an agency’s 
failure to provide any basis upon which its decisions were made 
rendered any such decisions invalid.102  The court also reiterated 
that the record of a rulemaking proceeding must contain the 
information and other materials that the agency relied upon to ensure 
that the decision was not arbitrary.103 Notably, the Supreme 
Court  has expanded the review of agency decision-making to 
situations where an agency modifies existing rules; the agency is 
also required to provide a reasonable analysis in support of 
the decision.104  
The Second Circuit ruled that effective judicial review of agency 
decision-making requires a complete record providing not only the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute it is implementing, but also a 
full explanation of the agency’s reasoning.105 The D.C. Circuit held 
                                                 
100 Amy Howe, Divided Court Denies Review in “Net Neutrality” Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/divided-
court-denies-review-in-net-neutrality-cases/. 
101 Terry, Memmel & Turacek, supra note 4. 
102 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
103 HBO v. FCC, 434 U.S. 988 (1977). 
104 Motor Vehicles Mfr’s Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
105 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d 
Cir. 1977). In Nova Scotia Foods the court quoted Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO 
v. Hogson on this point, stating, “What we are entitled to at all events is a careful 
identification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of 
the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where that 
choice purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the 
Secretary must, in form as well as in substance, find those facts from evidence in 
the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy 
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that to ensure a rational review of the agency decision-making 
required the court to examine the technical evidence, much of which 
was in dispute, to determine what information was used and what 
was discarded by the agency.106 The failure of an agency to produce 
a full record, as well as allow comments on the interpretation of the 
statute and the data the agency relied on when promulgating a 
regulation undermined the rationality of the decision by an 
agency.107  
The scope of review of agency action is specified in § 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), providing that “[a] reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning 
of applicability of the terms of an agency action.”108 Under § 706, a 
reviewing court will set aside agency actions it determines to be 
arbitrary and capricious.109 
The Chevron decision, which set the modern standard for 
judicial deference to agency decision-making, was an effort to 
establish a standard to show deference to the agency’s expertise.110 
Chevron provided parameters for the judiciary when reviewing 
agency decisions to help prevent courts from determining policy by 
overriding the agency’s expertise, which, in turn, would result in the 
undermining of administrative agencies and their expertise in policy 
implementation.111 
When reviewing agency action, a court applies the Chevron test 
to determine the legislative intent of a statute and what deference the 
court owes the agency and its expertise.112 Under the first step of the 
test, the court examines the controlling statute: if the meaning is 
                                                 
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide 
the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found 
to be persuasive.” 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
106 Ethel Corp v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
107 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Castle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
108 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). 
109 Id. § 706(2)(A). 
110 See Chevron, Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
838 (1984). 
111 Id. at 865. 
112 Id. at 843. 
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unambiguous, that meaning is determinative.113 Under the second 
step of the Chevron test, if a statute’s meaning is ambiguous, the 
court must uphold any reasonable interpretation of the statute by the 
agency, thus giving deference to the agency and its expertise.114 
Traditionally a reviewing court would give less deference to an 
agency’s legal conclusions than to an agency’s factual or 
discretionary determinations as a result of the agency’s expertise. 
Recently, judicial review of agency action has focused primarily on 
whether the agency followed proper procedure and took a “hard 
look” examination of the agency’s factual reasoning in the 
record.115 
Judicial review of agency action in formal proceedings is 
conducted under APA § 706(2)(E), which codifies the substantial 
evidence test. Under the substantial evidence test, courts uphold the 
agency’s decision where the evidence reasonably supports the 
agency’s stated conclusions.116 In so doing, the court is required to 
look at the whole record, including the evidence that supports and 
opposes the agency’s decision, as well as any decision by the 
administrative law judge. In Edison v. National Labor Relations 
Board, the Supreme Court had held that the burden of substantial 
evidence has been met when an agency has relied on “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion.”117 
 
II. MOZILLA CORPORATION V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION (2019) 
  
The D.C. Circuit held on October 1, 2019, that the FCC’s 
reclassification of broadband internet under Title I of the 
Telecommunications Act was “reasonable under Chevron,” finding 
                                                 
113 Id. at 842-43. 
114 Id. at 843-44. 
115 Ernest Gellhorn & Ronald Levin, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN 
A NUTSHELL 99 (5th ed. 2006). In some cases, agencies have tried to limit the 
necessary factual basis for a decision by interpreting a statute in a way that makes 
the evidentiary requirements lower. Id at 183. 
116 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1966). 
117 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
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that the FCC “has compelling policy grounds to ensure consistent 
treatment of the two varieties of broadband Internet access, fixed 
and mobile, subjecting both, or neither, to Title II.”118  
The per curiam decision was built around whether or not the 
FCC had the right to reclassify fixed broadband from a 
telecommunication service, as it had done in 2015, to an information 
service in the 2017 net neutrality repeal.119 A corresponding 
reclassification applied to mobile broadband, now designated as a 
private mobile service.120 As part of the reclassification process, the 
FCC relied on § 257 of the Communications Act of 1934 to adopt 
transparency rules about Internet Service Providers’ network 
practices.121 To support this regulatory approach, the FCC applied a 
cost-benefit analysis, concluding that the regulatory burdens 
brought about by reclassifying ISPs under Title II and imposing net 
neutrality conduct rules exceeded their benefits.122 
The majority opinion circled around this central point several 
times, granting a heavy deference to the FCC’s decision-making. 
Relying on the reclassification authority provided to the FCC by the 
2005 Brand X decision by the Supreme Court, as well as a liberal, 
wide-ranging application of the Chevron deference standard, the 
majority upheld the sections of the net neutrality repeal dealing with 
reclassification.123 
The D.C. Circuit first held that the decision in Brand X gave the 
FCC a great deal of latitude in terms of decisions about how to 
classify broadband, and that Chevron deference was appropriate to 
the decision the agency made:124 
All this of course proceeds in the shadow of Brand 
X, which itself applied Chevron to a similar issue. 
Applying these principles here, we hold that 
classifying broadband Internet access as an 
“information service” based on the functionalities of 
                                                 
118 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 35. 
119 Id. at 18. 
120 Id. 
121 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2018). 
122 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 70. 
123 Id. at 18. 
124 Id. at 20. 
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DNS and caching is “a reasonable policy choice for 
the [Commission] to make’ at Chevron’s second 
step.125 
The majority declared that, in Brand X, the Supreme Court had 
already held that it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that DNS 
and caching are information services integrated with the offering of 
internet service.126 Likewise, Chevron authorized the FCC’s 
conclusion that, “the vast majority of ordinary consumers . . . rely 
upon the DNS functionality provided by their ISP as ‘part and parcel 
of the broadband Internet access service.’”127 The majority held that 
the lack of a clear delegation from Congress left the FCC in a 
position to make some policy decisions, and that the lack of a 
conceptual framework to the FCC at the time of the net neutrality 
repeal or at the time of the 2015 Title II order had failed to provide 
any mandate on how the agency should handle the relationship 
between mobile broadband and VoIP.128  
Although some of the petitioners had raised specific challenges 
to the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality as arbitrary and capricious, the 
majority suggested that its review under the joint elements of Brand 
X and Chevron was “particularly deferential.”129 As such, the 
majority rejected arguments over the Restoring Internet Freedom 
order’s transparency requirements, stating the FCC had clearly 
explained the changes through cost benefit analysis. The majority 
held, “The Commission explained that the “additional obligations 
[of the former transparency rule did] not benefit consumers, 
entrepreneurs, or the Commission sufficiently to outweigh the 
burdens imposed on [broadband providers].”130 
Despite the particularly deferential standard being applied, the 
majority rejected the FCC’s suggestion to uphold the entire 
rulemaking authority on the weight behind the FCC’s statutory 
                                                 
125 Id. at 20. 
126 Id. at 21–22. 
127 Id. at 33 (citing Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 1). 
128 Id. at 40–43. 
129 Id. at 49. 
130 Id. 
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interpretation alone.131 The FCC had contended that the 
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation had insulated the 
Restoring Internet Freedom order from challenges that the order was 
arbitrary and capricious.132 The majority stated that although there 
was overlap between Chevron at step two and an arbitrary and 
capricious review, the argument itself misunderstood the law, and 
that each test in judicial review of the agency’s decision was 
independent.133 
The disagreement in the review process was a significant part of 
the split between Chevron deference on most of the Restoring 
Internet Freedom order and the portions of the order remanded by 
the court. 
The majority agreed that the FCC had advanced the  reasonable 
interpretation purposes of Chevron, but also ruled that the FCC’s 
failure to assess the impact of repealing net neutrality on public 
safety was still arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.134 In a similar line of reasoning, the majority applied 
the split standard to the FCC’s considerations of the Restoring 
Internet Freedom’s impact on pole-attachment regulation and the 
Lifeline Program, ruling the decision-making by the FCC to be 
inadequate on both issues.135 In terms of pole attachment, the FCC’s 
reclassification of broadband in the Restoring Internet Freedom 
order had created a statutory gap in FCC authority.136 
Petitioners challenged the FCC’s finding that reclassification of 
broadband as an information service was, “likely to increase ISP 
investment and output,” by objecting specifically to the studies the 
agency had relied on and its failure to credit certain alternative 
data.137 Again, by giving some credit to the FCC in terms of 
deference, the majority did a separate arbitrary and capricious 
review, and concluded that while some gaps may have existed, the 
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 59–63. 
135 Id. at 65–67. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 49. 
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agency had acted rationally.138 The court wrote, “[w]e find that the 
agency’s position as to the economic benefits of reclassification . . . 
which the Commission sees as ‘particularly inapt for a dynamic 
industry built on technological development and disruption,’ is 
supported by substantial evidence . . . and so reject Petitioners’ 
objections.”139 
The majority also agreed with the FCC’s cost benefit analysis 
conclusion that the harms the 2015 Title II order was designed to 
protect against could be achieved at a lower cost using transparency 
requirements, consumer protection, and antitrust enforcement 
measures.140 But the majority was quite skeptical, or even 
“troubled,” by the FCC’s reliance on this analysis, pointing out that 
the FCC had failed to consider that in one way or another, some form 
of open internet conduct rules had been in effect for the majority of 
the past twenty years.141 While chastising the FCC by pointing out 
that Title II rules covered DSL service from the late 1990s until the 
release of the FCC’s 2005 Wireline Broadband Order, the majority 
did not believe this was grounds for a reversal: 
We are . . . troubled by the Commission’s failure to 
grapple with the fact that, for much of the past two 
decades, broadband providers were subject to some 
degree of open Internet restrictions. . . . The 
Commission’s failure to acknowledge this regulatory 
history, however, does not provide grounds for 
reversal on this record given its view that market 
forces combined with other enforcement 
mechanisms, rather than regulation, are enough to 
limit harmful behavior by broadband providers.142 
Net neutrality has been seen as a mechanism that protects and 
fosters free expression online. The issue was a small element of the 
decision, but the opinion’s heavy focus on deference reduced the 
expression concerns to a secondary consideration. The majority 
                                                 
138 Id. at 50. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 55–56. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
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suggested that, while petitioners had raised the issue, it was not an 
important element of the challenge brought against the FCC’s repeal 
of net neutrality.143 Calling the free expression challenge, “bare-
boned,” the majority ruled that the challenge did not represent 
enough of a challenge to pose an issue for review by the court.144 
Beyond the limited nature of the petitioner’s challenge, the 
majority also argued that the FCC had used a cost benefit analysis 
in a reasonable way to support the “light-touch” regulation as a 
mechanism to promote innovation and openness online.145 As 
regulatory responsibilities would shift from the FCC to the 
Department of Justice and the FTC, incorporating controls designed 
to protect competitive behavior, the court stated that it was 
reasonable to “expect that competition would tend to multiply the 
voices in the public square.”146 
Relying on the FCC’s suggestion that under the order’s 
transparency provisions, ISP commitments, and the threat of FTC 
enforcement would act to protect free expression in a targeted way, 
the majority accepted the FCC’s contention that anti-trust law would 
protect competition which in turn will protect free expression.147 But 
the court also recognized the FCC was relying on a conceptual 
premise where some consumers would be willing to accept some 
infringement in trade for other benefits, holding that “[a]t the same 
time, the Commission frankly acknowledges that “[t]he competitive 
process and antitrust would not protect free expression in cases 
where consumers have decided that they are willing to tolerate some 
blocking or throttling in order to obtain other things of value.”148  
The court also rejected a challenge over evidence in the record 
brought by Petitioner National Hispanic Media Coalition, which had 
requested the FCC consider numerous informal consumer 
complaints filed under the previous rules obtained from the FCC 
through a Freedom of Information Act request.149 The FCC denied 
                                                 
143 Id. at 71–72. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 71. 
147 Id. at 72. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 73–74. 
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the motion to include the informal comments on the grounds that it 
was “exceedingly unlikely” that those complaints raised any issue 
that was not already identified in the large quantity of material in the 
record.150 
The FCC’s victory in Mozilla was one with narrow margins and 
required the agency to address three key issues: the agency’s 
preemption directive, pole attachment authority, and the Lifeline 
program.151 
First, the Court concludes that the Commission has 
not shown legal authority to issue its Preemption 
Directive, which would have barred states from 
imposing any rule or requirement that the 
Commission “repealed or decided to refrain from 
imposing” in the Order or that is “more stringent” 
than the Order. The Court accordingly vacates that 
portion of the Order. Second, we remand the Order 
to the agency on three discrete issues: (1) The Order 
failed to examine the implications of its decisions for 
public safety; (2) the Order does not sufficiently 
explain what reclassification will mean for 
regulation of pole attachments; and (3) the agency 
did not adequately address Petitioners' concerns 
about the effects of broadband reclassification on the 
Lifeline Program.152 
The court added that these “aspects of the Commission’s 
decision are still arbitrary and capricious under the [APA] because 
of the [FCC’s] failure to address [these] important and statutorily 
mandated consideration[s].”153 
As several observers explained, the first issue meant that the 
FCC does not have the legal authority to prohibit state legislatures 
from passing their own net neutrality rules,154 with some states 
already taking such actions prior to the D.C. Circuit ruling.155 The 
                                                 
150 Id. at 73. 
151 Id. at 18. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 49. 
154 McGill, supra note 19; Neidig, supra note 17. 
155 See infra notes 198–200. 
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second issue meant that the FCC had other portions of its Restoring 
Internet Freedom order that needed to be addressed, including those 
related to ISPs throttling data services of public safety departments 
like in Santa Clara. 
Governmental petitioners challenged the repeal of net 
neutrality’s preemption directive, arguing that the way the FCC was 
applying preemption exceeded the agency’s statutory authority.156 
The majority ruled that the directive was far beyond simple conflict 
preemption, that the FCC had ignored binding precedent and “[t]hat 
failure is fatal.”157 Arguing that the FCC had given itself powers to 
invalidate all state and local laws that interfered with either federal 
regulatory objectives or any element of broadband service, the 
majority ruled that the preemption directive functionally represented 
a prejudged intent, in place from the moment it went into effect, for 
the FCC to preempt any state laws that would conflict with the 
Restoring Internet Freedom order.158 The court further argued that: 
For the Preemption Directive to stand, then, the 
Commission must have had express or ancillary 
authority to issue it. It had neither. The Preemption 
Directive could not possibly be an exercise of the 
Commission’s express statutory authority. By 
reclassifying broadband as an information service, 
the Commission placed broadband outside of its Title 
II jurisdiction.159 
Although the FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband under Title 
I was a valid policy choice, the FCC argued that it could not simply 
turn around and argue for preemption authority by analogy.160 The 
majority proposed that the FCC go back to Congress with any 
complaints about this statutory gap.161 According to the court, 
                                                 
156 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 74. 
157 Id. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 75–76. 
160 Id. at 79 (“The best the Commission can do is try to argue by analogy. It 
claims that it would be ‘incongruous’ not to extend preemption authority under 
Title I, given that Section 160(e) prohibits States from regulating a service 
classified under Title II in instances of federal forbearance.”). 
161 Id. at 80. 
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absent new Congressional action, the ability of the FCC to apply 
preemption to competing laws at the state or local level required the 
agency to identify an applicable statutory delegation of regulatory 
authority, an act the majority clearly stated the FCC had failed to do 
in the 2018 order.162  
Lacking any legal authority, the FCC’s action to preempt even 
potential laws in every state was a step too far. Vacating the FCC’s 
preemption directive from the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, 
the court also ruled that because no state laws were at issue in the 
case, it was, “premature to pass on the preemptive effect, under 
conflict or other recognized preemption principles, of the remaining 
portions of the 2018 Order.”163 
Preemption was also a significant issue in the arguments raised 
in the concurring opinions by Judges Patricia Millett and Robert L. 
Wilkins, as well as Judge Stephen F. Williams’s opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. Judge Millet’s concurring opinion 
came with “substantial reservations.”164 Agreeing that Brand X 
provided a clear precedent to uphold the FCC’s reclassification of 
broadband as an information service as reasonable, Judge Millet 
stated a deep concern that the “result is unhinged from the realities 
of modern broadband service.”165 
 Arguing that the FCC’s analysis focused on the value added to 
consumers rather than tie that value to a convenient item that had 
promoted the FCC’s policy preferences, Judge Millet suggested that 
the FCC’s decision was divorced from market realities and was, 
“performing Hamlet without the Prince”166 because the FCC’s 
policy had wrongly declared the transmission element as an 
information service rather than the integrated component or pet and 
leash standard proposed by Brand X.167 
Noting that the FCC’s capricious view of what constituted an 
information service would risk one point that all sides had agreed 
on, that traditional telephone belonged within the common carrier 
                                                 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 86. 
164 Id. (Millet, J., concurring) at 86. 
165 Id. at 87. 
166 Id. at 91. 
167 Id. at 92. 
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constraints of Title II, Judge Millet suggested that the FCC had made 
a concerning decision that had drifted beyond the boundaries of its 
statutory authority and discretion.168 Despite the concern, Judge 
Millet also found that it was the Supreme Court’s “prerogative” to 
reexamine Brand X in more contemporary terms and to require the 
FCC to bring the regulation in line with the realities of the 
contemporary broadband market.169 Until either the Supreme Court 
or Congress forced the FCC into action, Judge Millet explained that 
she was bound to concur in sustaining the Commission’s action.170 
Judge Williams’ lengthy opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part was largely focused on the preemption issue.171 
Judge Williams was extremely skeptical that the majority could 
agree to grant deference to the FCC over major portions of the Open 
Internet order, but undermine the preemption directive because the 
FCC’s decision to move broadband regulation to Title I was 
predicated heavily on preemption authority.172 
Arguing that since there were no examples of state laws that 
would be in conflict with the FCC’s Title I authority that leaned 
heavily in favor of waiting until a specific challenge arose, Judge 
Williams also suggested that Congress had a significant role to play 
in resolving the boundaries of the FCC’s preemption authority under 
Title I.173 Agreeing with the majority decision that the 1996 
Telecommunication Act provided the FCC the authority to apply 
either Title I or Title II, Judge Williams argued that not extending 
the same level of deference to the FCC on the preemption directive 
would undermine the 2018 order by exposing broadband to a 




This Part argues that the D.C. Circuit ruling not only failed to 
fully clarify the net neutrality debate, but also raised new questions, 
                                                 
168 Id. at 92–94. 
169 Id. at 94. 
170 Id. at 89. 
171 Id. (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) at 95–107. 
172 Id. at 95. 
173 Id. at 96. 
174 Id. at 100. 
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including several for the FCC to address. In order to see the net 
neutrality debate resolved, the most logical solution would be an 
updated delegation of authority from Congress. Although at least 
four states, including California, had passed state level provisions 
before the Mozilla decision, state level provisions will likely confuse 
the issue even more as the FCC and states battle over preemption.  
 
A.  D.C. Circuit Left Net Neutrality Unresolved 
 
Taken as a whole, the D.C. Circuit ruling left many questions 
unanswered (and likely created new ones), which are related to net 
neutrality in three ways. First, because the D.C. Circuit held that the 
FCC was within its authority to repeal the net neutrality rules and 
reclassify broadband internet under Title I of the 
Telecommunications Act, it seems the court would likely reach a 
similar ruling if the agency were to once again classify ISPs under 
Title II. Such an action remains a possibility, especially if a 
Democratic administration takes the White House and the FCC in 
2020. The result is that the future of net neutrality remains in 
question when a different FCC has deference to reclassify 
broadband internet once again. 
Second, the D.C. Circuit overturned the preemption doctrine, 
which functionally prohibits the FCC from attempting to bar state 
legislation and executive orders creating new net neutrality rules.175 
Although allowing the FCC to bar such laws would have helped 
resolve the net neutrality debate and aid implementation across the 
United States, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling meant that state legislatures 
and governors will likely continue to take actions aimed at net 
neutrality. As discussed more below, several states prior to 2019 had 
already taken actions towards implementing net neutrality rules, 
with likely more states to follow.176 The result would be varying net 
neutrality protections depending on which state an ISP and/or 
consumer is located, leading to a complicated and messy legal 
landscape. Furthermore, such efforts by states could become the 
subject of lawsuits, perhaps even by the FCC, further muddying net 
neutrality protections across the country. 
                                                 
175 Id. at 86. 
176 See infra notes 184–199. 
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Finally, the D.C. Circuit remanding three issues to the FCC 
meant that those questions remain unanswered and require new 
attention by the agency. As the situation with Verizon in Santa Clara 
demonstrated, ISPs and consumers have already disagreed about the 
cause and intent behind throttling even in public safety situations, 
suggesting that such disagreement and contentiousness will only 
continue moving forward as ISPs test the boundaries of blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization. 
Although the D.C. Circuit ruling on the surface clarified key 
questions about net neutrality rules, it, in fact, only further 
complicated the legal picture. The ruling ultimately left the door 
open for the FCC to take actions under different administrations, 
meaning the net neutrality debate could continue to go back and 
forth for years to come. 
 
B.  Congress or the States Need to Provide Resolution to the Net 
Neutrality Debate 
 
We argue that Congress needs to provide at least some resolution 
to the net neutrality debate by directing the FCC. On one hand, 
Congress could pass legislation preventing the FCC from enforcing 
net neutrality regulations, though such efforts currently face 
significant opposition.177 Alternatively, Congress could make key 
and necessary changes to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
clarifying whether ISPs fall under Title I as information services or 
Title II as telecommunication services subject to common carrier 
regulation. Certainly, Congress could take addition actions to amend 
or otherwise change the law as well. Nevertheless, the result would 
be an end to the back-and-forth that has taken place between 
different FCC administrations about the classification of ISPs. This 
would potentially result in companies being classified one way or 
                                                 
177 See Mallory Locklear, Net neutrality still faces an uphill battle in 
Congress, ENGADGET (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/05/16/net-neutrality-faces-uphill-battle-in-
congress/; Makena Kelly, White House Threatens To Veto Democrat-Led Net 
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another, meaning under Title I or Title II, therefore either allowing 
or restricting rules around blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization. 
Significantly, Congress has shown that it can take at least some 
actions related to net neutrality. On May 16, 2018, the U.S. Senate 
passed a resolution of disapproval aiming to block the FCC’s repeal 
of net neutrality.178 Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) had 
previously introduced the resolution of disapproval in February 
2018179 under the Congressional Review Act, which allows 
Congress 60 days to challenge new rules passed by an independent 
agency, such as the FCC.180 The Senate voted 52-47 in favor of the 
resolution, with all 49 Democratic senators voting for the resolution, 
as well as three Republicans.181 
On April 10, 2019, several media outlets reported that the U.S. 
House of Representatives had passed a bill by a 232-190 vote aiming 
to reinstate the net neutrality protections passed by the FCC in 
2015.182 However, Vox reported that President Trump said he would 
                                                 
178 See generally Brian Fung, Senate Approves Bipartisan Resolution to 
Restore FCC Net Neutrality Rules, WASH. POST (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/16/net-
neutrality-is-getting-a-big-vote-in-the-senate-today-heres-what-to-
expect/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.57a8dfcd9711; Andrew Wyrich, As the Net 
Neutrality CRA Deadline in Congress Approaches, Support Continues to Grow, 
DAILY DOT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/net-neutrality-cra-
fcc/; Scott Memmel, FCC Repeal of Net Neutrality Takes Effect, Faces Continued 
Legal and Legislative Opposition, 23 SILHA BULL. 43 (2018) (available at 
https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/203919). 
179 Press Release, Sen. Edward J. Markey, Senator Markey Leads Resolution 
to Restore FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules (Dec. 14, 2017), available at 
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-leads-
resolution-to-restore-fccs-net-neutrality-rules. 
180 Dylan Scott, The new Republican plan to deregulate America, explained, 
VOX (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-act-what-regulations-has-
trump-cut. 
181 Fung, supra note 178. 
182 Save the Internet Act of 2019, H.R. 1644, 116th Cong. (2019); see also 
David Shepardson, U.S. House Approves Net Neutrality Bill but Legislation Faces 
Long Odds, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
internet/u-s-house-approves-net-neutrality-bill-but-legislation-faces-long-odds-
idUSKCN1RM24X; Jason Abbruzzese, House Passes Net Neutrality Bill — but 
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veto the bill and that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
called the bill “dead on arrival in the Senate.”183  
If Congress fails to act or provide sufficient resolution to the net 
neutrality debate, it would fall on the states to implement such rules. 
Although states may be able to provide some resolution, a 
patchwork of state laws will not provide lasting, consistent or 
coherent resolution to the already complicated legal and policy net 
neutrality landscape.  
In 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law SB 
822, the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality 
Act of 2018.184 The California law prohibits ISPs from “[b]locking 
lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, 
subject to reasonable network management.”185 The law also 
prohibits the “[i]mpairing or degrading [of] Internet traffic on the 
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a 
nonharmful device,” meaning ISPs cannot impair or degrade “(1) 
particular content, applications, or services; (2) particular classes of 
content, applications, or services; (3) lawful Internet traffic to 
particular nonharmful devices; or (4) lawful Internet traffic to 
particular classes of nonharmful devices.”186 Additionally, the law 
prohibits “paid prioritization,” which the law defines as the 
“management of an Internet service provider’s network to directly 
or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic.”187 
                                                 
it Won't Have Much of a Chance in the Senate, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/house-passes-net-neutrality-bill-it-
won-t-have-much-n992991; Cecilia Kang, Net Neutrality Vote Passes House, 
Fulfilling Promise by Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/technology/net-neutrality-vote.html. 
183 Ella Nilsen, Why the Senate is Blocking a New Net Neutrality Bill, a Year 
After Trying to Save it, VOX (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/10/18302186/net-neutrality-house-bill-senate. 
184 S. 822, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (2017). – This needs to be double 
checked   
185 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3101(a)(1) (West 2019); see also Sarah Wiley, Repeal 
of Net Neutrality Rules Continues to Face Legal Uncertainty, 24 SILHA BULL. 34 
(2018) (available at https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/203922). 
186 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3100(j)(1)-(4) (West 2019). 
187 §3100(r)(1)-(2). 
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However, approximately an hour after Governor Brown signed 
the California law, the U.S. DOJ filed a lawsuit in federal court in 
California to block the law from going into effect, arguing that 
California lacked sufficient authority to regulate ISPs.188 On 
October 26, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and the 
DOJ agreed to postpone litigation pending the D.C. Circuit’s ruling 
in Mozilla.189 As discussed above, because of the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling on the state’s rights issue, the fight over net neutrality will 
likely continue in California. 
California, however, is not the only state to consider net 
neutrality legislation. The National Conference of State Legislatures 
reported in January 2019 that net neutrality legislation had been 
introduced in 29 states, with over 65 bills introduced requiring 
internet service providers to ensure various net neutrality 
principles.190 In 13 states and Washington, D.C., 23 resolutions have 
been introduced opposing the repeal of net neutrality rules, urging 
Congress to take action to restore the rules, or stating the state’s 
support for net neutrality principles.191 
In 2018, both Washington and Oregon passed legislation 
enforcing net neutrality requirements for government agencies 
working with ISPs.192 On March 6, 2018, Washington Governor Jay 
Inslee signed House Bill 2282, which first requires “[a]ny person 
providing broadband internet access service in Washington state [to] 
                                                 
188 Complaint at 1, United States v. California, 413 F. Supp.3d 1077 (E.D. 
Cal. 2018) (No. 18-264). 
189 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, California Postpones Net Neutrality Law 
Pending Outcome Of Federal Court Challenge, DEADLINE (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://deadline.com/2018/10/california-net-neutrality-delay-law-pending-
outcome-court-challenge-1202490374/; Jon Brodkin, Net Neutrality Delay: Calif. 
Agrees to Suspend Law Until After Court Case, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/10/california-delays-net-neutrality-
laws-enforcement-until-after-court-case/. 
190 Heather Morton, Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGIS. (Jan. 23, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx. 
191 Id. 
192 See H.R. 2282, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); H.R. 4155, 79th 
Leg. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); see also Terry, Memmel & Turacek, 
supra note 4. 
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publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance characteristics, and 
commercial terms of its broadband internet access services.” 193 
Second, the law prohibits any “person engaged in the provision of 
broadband internet access service in Washington state” from “(a) 
Block[ing] lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful 
devices, subject to reasonable network management; (b) Impair[ing] 
or degrad[ing] lawful internet traffic on the basis of internet content, 
application, or service . . . or (c) Engag[ing] in paid 
prioritization.”194 The law therefore reflects the FCC’s net neutrality 
rules passed in 2015. 
Like the Washington statute, ORS § 276A.418 (2019) prohibits 
a public body from contracting “with a broadband Internet access 
service provider” that:  
(a) Engages in paid prioritization;  
(b) Blocks lawful content, applications or services or 
nonharmful devices;  
(c) Impairs or degrades lawful Internet traffic for the 
purpose of discriminating against or favoring certain 
Internet content, applications or services or the use 
of nonharmful devices;  
(d) Unreasonably interferes with or unreasonably 
disadvantages an end user’s ability to select, access 
and use the broadband Internet access service or 
lawful Internet content, applications or services or 
devices of the end user’s choice; or  
(e) Unreasonably interferes with or unreasonably 
disadvantages an edge provider’s ability to make 
                                                 
193 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.385.020(3) (2018). 
194 Id. § 19.385.020(2). The law also includes exceptions if ISPs have an 
obligation or authorization “to address the needs of emergency communications 
or law enforcement, public safety, or national security authorities” or in cases in 
which the ISP regulates unlawful content. Id. § 1(3)(a). 
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devices or lawful content, applications or services 
available to end users.195 
The law also requires that ISPs “publicly disclose information 
regarding the provider’s network management practices and 
performance characteristics and the commercial terms of the 
provider’s broadband Internet access service sufficient for end users 
to verify that the service is provided in compliance with subsections 
(3) and (4) of this section.”196 
Additionally, several state governors signed executive orders 
requiring public-sector businesses, organizations, and agencies in 
their states to only work with ISPs that uphold or practice net 
neutrality principles.197 For example, in Hawaii, Governor David  
Ige’s Executive Order No. 18-02 directed all state government 
agencies to only contract with ISPs “who demonstrate and 
contractually agree to support and practice net neutrality principles 
where all Internet traffic is treated equally.”198 Rhode Island, New 
Jersey, New York, Montana, and Vermont also required state 
entities award future contracts only to ISPs that adhere to these net 
neutrality principles, which generally prohibit blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization of lawful internet content by ISPs.199 
                                                 
195 OR. REV. STAT. § 276A.418(1) (2019). 
196 Id. § (5)(a). The law also contains some exceptions, including if the ISP 
is the “sole provider of fixed broadband Internet access service to the geographic 
location subject to the contract.” Id. § 1(j)(4)(a). 
197 Daniel Lyons, State Net Neutrality, 80 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 905, 930, 948-
950 (2019).; see also  Terry, Memmel & Turacek, supra note 4. 
198 Haw. Exec. Order No. 18-02 (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Executive-Order-No.-
18-02-Net-Neutrality-Signed.pdf. 
199 See R.I. Exec. Order No. 18-02 (Apr. 24, 2018), 
http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/ExecOrder18-02.pdf; N. J. Exec. 
Order No. 9 (Feb. 5, 2018), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-9.pdf; 
N. Y. Exec. Order No. 175 (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/old-
files//EO%20%23175.pdf; Mont. Exec. Order, No. 3-2018 (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://governor.mt.gov/Portals/16/docs/2018EOs/EO-03-
2018_Net%20Freedom.pdf?ver=2018-01-22-122048-023; Vt. Exec. Order No. 2-
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Lastly, mayors in hundreds of jurisdictions around the United 
States signed a petition ensuring that their local governments would 
only work with ISPs that uphold/practice net neutrality principles,200 
demonstrating that the debate around net neutrality, including after 
the D.C. Circuit ruling, can and will continue at the local level as 
well. 
Taken as a whole, the actions by Congress and several states lead 
to two conclusions. First, they demonstrate the complexity of the net 
neutrality debate, which necessitates some resolution. Because the 
D.C. Circuit left the door wide open for Congressional and state 
actions, such complexity is unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily. 
Second, if Congress fails to act, states are likely to continue to try to 
provide resolution, though it will likely only further complicate the 
legal landscape.201 
 
C.  Congress or the States Should Uphold Net Neutrality 
Principles 
 
Although this Article argues that Congress or the states need to 
provide resolution one way or another, it further contends that each 
would, ideally, implement complementary net neutrality rules. We 
argue that there are several reasons to do so, but perhaps one of the 
most important is that such rules promote free expression on the 
internet.  
The internet promotes key values—free expression, access to 
information, and viewpoint diversity—that have been the focus of 
past media systems, including the Postal Service, telegraph, and 
radio.202 At the same time, although refuted by some scholars, the 
                                                 
200 Dell Cameron, 100 US Mayors Sign Pledge to Defend Net Neutrality 
Against Crooked ISPs, GIZMODO (Apr. 27, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/100-us-
mayors-sign-pledge-to-defend-net-neutrality-agai-1825612839; Cities Open 
Internet Pledge, MAYORSFORNETNEUTRALITY.ORG, 
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSctOwOuAZajo8BgYGzM4l0Wem
NeyBFnURoNWPg44971caMcuQ/viewform (last visited July 23, 2018). 
201 Daniel Lyons, State Net Neutrality, 80 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 905, 930, 948-
950 (2019). 
202 See Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern 
Communication 5 (2004), in which Starr suggests that constitutive choices related 
to mass media come in three areas. The first, are the laws and societal norms 
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internet does raise issues of scarcity along the same vein as radio. 
Scarcity is a concept traditionally associated with electromagnetic 
spectrum, but is analogous to bandwidth limitations as well as the 
availability of internet service. Regarding radio, scarcity arises in 
that broadcast spectrum is limited or scarce.203 Jeremy Lipschultz 
argued that scarcity arises in relation to the internet because “the 
existing network has seen a considerable slowdown in data transfer; 
the system at times reached capacity, resulting in no service for the 
user.” 204 In short, high traffic online can create slower speeds for 
users, limiting their ability to see certain content. Perhaps more 
significantly, there are many places in the United States where 
individuals not only do not have a choice of ISP, but, in some cases, 
have no ISP at all, meaning they cannot access the internet.205 The 
FCC has been tasked with overseeing broadband deployment to 
these rural areas, but the ability to access the internet remains 
impossible for some and nearly impossible for others who have 
speeds of 25 Mbps or less.206  
Because of the physical problems associated with internet 
access, net neutrality can be seen as a “technocratic solution,”207 or, 
                                                 
dealing with freedom of expression, access to information, privacy and 
intellectual property. The second area of constitutive choices deal with the design 
of a country’s communication media and networks, as well as, its larger industrial 
organization. Finally, the third area of choices includes the decision-making, the 
support for and the acceptance of education, research, and innovation all of which 
play a role in how technology is deployed. 
203 See Audrey Perry, Scarcity Rationale, First Amendment Encyclopedia 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/1016/scarcity-rationale. 
204 Jeremy Lipschultz, Free Expression in the Age of the Internet 62 (1999). 
205 FEDERAL COMMC’NS. COMM’N, FIXED BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT 
(2019), https://broadbandmap.fcc.gov. 
206 Daniel Frankel, Nearly 16% of Broadband ‘Power Users’ Have 
Connection Speeds of 75 Mbps or Less, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.multichannel.com/news/16-percent-of-broadband-power-users-
have-slow-connection-speeds. 
207 Hugh Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in 
the United States, 1920-1960, at xiv (2000) (“not only the belief that technical 
experts should make traditional political decisions in a society increasingly 
dependent on complex technologies and technological systems, but also to the 
tendency by decision makers to follow values of instrumental rationality, 
efficiency, and specialization.. . . A commitment to technocratic values has led 
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at the very least, part of a larger set of technocratic solutions to 
scarcity, such as the widespread market failures caused by a lack of 
broadband competition.208 Net neutrality promotes free expression 
by ensuring that users have access to information and content online. 
It does so by preventing ISPs from blocking, throttling, or otherwise 
discriminating against content, which would limit the information 
some users would be able to see. This is significant because, in 
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court recently ruled 
that access to social media, and the internet more generally, was a 
necessary function/ability of anyone in the United States, even those 
convicted of crimes.209 In short, net neutrality is meant to ensure the 
free flow of information to any individual using the internet, 
providing them with information that allows them to be an informed 
voter, to be entertained, or to otherwise benefit from internet 
content. The FCC seems to understand that net neutrality comes 
with a free expression component, but argues that free expression is 
potentially a consumer’s bargaining chip that can be traded for some 
form of undefined benefit in the “light-touch” regime.210 Yet, 
without net neutrality rules, ISPs would, at a minimum, have the 
ability and authority to limit access to certain information, an action 
                                                 
participants to argue that technological, rather than traditional political, solutions, 
are most appropriate for solving social problems resulting from technological 
developments.”). 
208 Bill Snyder & Chris Witteman, The Anti-Competitive Forces That Foil 
Speedy, Affordable Broadband, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90319916/the-anti-competitive-forces-that-foil-
speedy-affordable-broadband; Christopher Terry, 3500 Days of The National 
Broadband Plan, BENTON INST. FOR BROADBAND & SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.benton.org/blog/3500-days-national-broadband-plan; FED. COMM’N 
COMM., EIGHTH MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA FIXED BROADBAND REPORT 
(2018), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/measuring-broadband-
america/measuring-fixed-broadband-eighth-report. 
209 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (“A fundamental First Amendment principle 
is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, 
after reflection, speak and listen once more. Today, one of the most important 
places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media[.]”). 
210 See Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 72 (citing Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 
1) (“At the same time, the Commission frankly acknowledges that “[t]he 
competitive process and antitrust would not protect free expression in cases where 
consumers have decided that they are willing to tolerate some blocking or 
throttling in order to obtain other things of value.”). 
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that has already taken place211 and that is antithetical to the core 




In its October 1, 2019 ruling, the D.C. Circuit allowed for the 
repeal of the net neutrality rules passed during President Barack 
Obama’s administration, finding that the FCC had the authority to 
reclassify broadband internet under Title I and, therefore, allowing 
ISPs to block, throttle, or otherwise discriminate against certain 
internet content. However, the court also remanded several issues 
back to the FCC for the agency to address. As this Article argued, 
the result of the court’s ruling was that the net neutrality debate 
remained unresolved as future FCC administrations retain the ability 
to reclassify ISPs once more, among other questions raised by the 
D.C. Circuit ruling.  
Therefore, it is necessary for Congress to step in and offer at 
least some guidance on net neutrality, providing at least some 
resolution to a debate that has lasted nearly 15 years. Although any 
form of resolution would be beneficial at this stage, Congress or 
states should allow for the implementation of net neutrality rules 
once again in order to protect the free flow of information, as well 
as users’ ability to access content online; values at the heart of 
American media systems dating back to the 18th century. 
                                                 
211 See Timothy Karr, Net Neutrality Violations: A Brief History, FREE PRESS 
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-
analysis/explainers/net-neutrality-violations-brief-history; Jacob Kastrenakes, 
ISPs Won’t Promise to Treat All Traffic Equally After Net Neutrality, VERGE 
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/15/16768088/internet-
providers-plans-without-net-neutrality-comcast-att-verizon; Aria Bracci & Lia 
Petronio, New Research Shows That, Post Net Neutrality, Internet Providers are 
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